The Saudi Nuclear Question and the Regionalization of Deterrence

In one of my previous columns, I argued that Iran's nuclear ambitions represented one of the greatest long-term strategic challenges facing the Middle East (and the Western World). Despite the recent war and the severe degradation of Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure, that fundamental problem has not disappeared. On the contrary, the discussion has now shifted from Tehran to Riyadh.

The Trump administration's decision to support the development of a civilian nuclear program for Saudi Arabia carries consequences that extend far beyond energy policy. Whether intentionally or not, it introduces new strategic questions that are military, political, and geopolitical in nature. More importantly, it may represent another step toward the regionalization of international security, where local powers increasingly assume responsibility for their own deterrence rather than relying indefinitely on external guarantees.

Saudi Arabia recently signed a defense agreement with Pakistan. Although officially presented as a broader security partnership, many analysts interpreted it as placing Pakistan's nuclear umbrella over the Kingdom. As I explained in another column, this was, in practical terms, the purchase of an external nuclear deterrent. Yet relying on another country's nuclear arsenal is fundamentally different from possessing one. Pakistan must balance its own strategic priorities, particularly its rivalry with India, while simultaneously maintaining a complex relationship with Iran. From Riyadh's perspective, these realities inevitably raise an uncomfortable question: can another state ever be trusted with your ultimate national security?

That question may explain why Saudi Arabia continues to pursue an independent civilian nuclear program. The issue is not necessarily the immediate construction of a nuclear weapon. Rather, it is the gradual development of the scientific, industrial, and technological infrastructure that would allow the Kingdom to become a threshold nuclear state should the regional environment deteriorate further.

The implications extend well beyond Saudi Arabia itself. The Middle East is a region characterized by abundant financial resources, persistent geopolitical instability, and growing fragmentation. Under these conditions, the spread of national nuclear capabilities becomes a strategic concern for every neighboring state. Nuclear proliferation is never simply a bilateral problem. Every new program changes the strategic calculations of every other regional actor.

History offers a useful comparison. North Korea did not simply become a nuclear state. Its program fundamentally altered the security architecture of Northeast Asia. Japan and South Korea, despite remaining under the American nuclear umbrella, have repeatedly debated whether they should eventually develop independent nuclear deterrents. China, meanwhile, has spent decades attempting to manage the consequences of North Korea's nuclear development without fully controlling its trajectory. Rather than producing stability, the emergence of a new nuclear actor created a permanent regional security dilemma.

The Middle East may now face a similar challenge. As the United States gradually reduces its direct role in maintaining the global order, regional powers increasingly perceive that they must assume greater responsibility for their own security. If Saudi Arabia develops the technological capacity to become a threshold nuclear state, other regional actors may eventually reconsider their own strategic positions. The result would not necessarily be an immediate nuclear arms race, but the gradual construction of independent regional deterrence systems.

This leads me to a concept that I have been developing over the past months: semi-enclosed regional security systems.

A semi-enclosed regional security system emerges when a region becomes increasingly capable of generating and sustaining its own security dynamics, independent of external powers. Military competition, political rivalries, technological development, and nuclear deterrence begin reinforcing one another inside the same geographic space. External actors continue to influence the region, but no longer dominate it. The system develops its own balance of power, escalation dynamics, and strategic logic.

The Korean Peninsula illustrates many of these characteristics today. The Middle East may gradually evolve in the same direction.

However, a semi-enclosed regional security system is neither flawless nor hermetically sealed. Regional security systems rarely remain confined within their own geographical boundaries. Decisions taken by one actor inevitably alter the strategic calculations of neighboring states, creating pressures that gradually spread beyond the original region.

For example, if Saudi Arabia or Israel were to openly develop or consolidate independent nuclear capabilities outside a broader regional security framework, the consequences would almost certainly extend beyond the Gulf itself. Countries such as Egypt and Turkey would be forced to reconsider their own strategic positions, potentially transforming a regional security dilemma into a much broader geopolitical one. The original system would remain geographically identifiable, but new connections would emerge, allowing instability to diffuse into adjacent regions.

This is precisely why the return of buffer zones is becoming increasingly important. Throughout history, great powers have attempted to contain conflicts by creating geographical spaces capable of absorbing military, political, and ideological competition before it reached neighboring regions. Today's proxy conflicts, stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Levant, increasingly perform a similar function. They are not simply local wars; they are strategic spaces where regional rivalries can be managed, redirected, or contained before they expand into wider international confrontations.

If this interpretation is correct, the return of proxy wars and buffer zones is not a historical coincidence. It is one of the structural consequences of an international order that is becoming progressively more fragmented and increasingly organized around regional systems of power.

This process is not inevitable, but it is becoming increasingly plausible.

If that is indeed the long-term direction of American strategy, Washington may be accepting greater regional instability in exchange for reducing its own strategic commitments and concentrating resources on what many policymakers consider the defining challenge of the twenty-first century: competition with China.

That strategy carries obvious risks. Once regional deterrence systems mature, they become increasingly difficult for outside powers to influence. Every new nuclear capability changes the strategic calculations of neighboring states while simultaneously reducing external leverage over regional security decisions.

What options, then, remain? The first possibility is that Saudi Arabia continues relying on extended deterrence provided by partners such as Pakistan or the United States while maintaining only a civilian nuclear program. This would preserve the current regional balance but requires a level of long-term trust that history rarely guarantees.

A second possibility is that Riyadh develops what strategists often describe as nuclear latency: the scientific knowledge, industrial infrastructure, and fuel-cycle capabilities necessary to produce a weapon without openly crossing that threshold. Such a strategy would increase Saudi deterrence while avoiding the political costs of formal nuclear proliferation.

A third scenario is the most destabilizing. Saudi Arabia could eventually decide that only an independent nuclear arsenal guarantees its security. Such a decision would almost certainly encourage other regional powers to reconsider their own positions, increasing the risk of a broader regional nuclear competition.

Finally, there remains a fourth possibility: the construction of a new regional security architecture capable of reducing incentives for nuclear proliferation through diplomatic agreements, mutual deterrence, and confidence-building mechanisms. Although this represents the most stable outcome, it also appears the least likely under current regional conditions.

The Saudi nuclear question is therefore much larger than the future of one country's energy program. It raises a broader strategic issue that extends across the Middle East and, perhaps, other regions facing similar transformations. As the international order fragments and local powers assume greater responsibility for their own security, nuclear deterrence may become one of the foundations upon which new semi-enclosed regional security systems are built.

Whether these systems ultimately produce stability, permanent instability, or evolve into new forms of international cooperation remains one of the defining geopolitical questions of the emerging world order.

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