From Class Struggle to Cooperative Competition: A Game-Theoretic Critique

Introduction

Marxism has exerted a profound influence on social, economic, and political theory over the past two centuries. Beyond its historical impact, it remains a frequently invoked interpretative framework for analyzing phenomena such as inequality, social conflict, and the dynamics of capitalism. However, when one examines its foundational assumptions, Marxism reveals three central features: historical fatalism, economic determinism, and a zero-sum logic in its explanation of social and productive relations.

These features are not merely theoretical; they have had practical consequences in the political experiments inspired by Marxism during the twentieth century. The view of history as an inevitable process culminating in communism, the emphasis on the primacy of economic structures over human agency, and the conception of class conflict as a distributive game in which one class’s gain is the other’s loss shaped central planning policies, visions of irreconcilable antagonism, and closed models of historical interpretation.

In contrast to this paradigm, game theory, developed by John Nash and other economists in the twentieth century, offers a radically different conceptual alternative. From this perspective, human interactions are not predetermined by inexorable historical laws but are structured as strategic games in which multiple equilibria are possible. Moreover, not all social exchange follows a zero-sum logic: in many cases, cooperation can expand the joint surplus, challenging the Marxist vision of irreducible exploitation.

The purpose of this work is to contrast these two frameworks, showing how game theory can dismantle Marxist paradigms in three key dimensions: the fatalistic inevitability of history, the structural determinism of the economy, and the zero-sum distributive logic of social relations.

Literature Review

The Marxist tradition has been one of the most influential in historical and social analysis. From the Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848) to Engels’s writings on scientific socialism (1880), it articulated a teleological view of history in which modes of production succeed one another inevitably, culminating in the overthrow of capitalism and the advent of communism. This conception has its roots in Hegel’s philosophy of history (1837), which interpreted historical processes as a rational unfolding with a necessary end. Marx reworked this teleology in materialist terms, proposing economic determinism as the driving force behind social transformations (Marx 1859). Within this framework, class conflict was understood as an irreducible, distributive zero-sum antagonism: what one class gains, the other necessarily loses.

In contrast, game theory, inaugurated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and expanded by Nash (1950), proposed a non-teleological but strategic approach to social interaction. The Nash equilibrium concept demonstrated that outcomes are not determined by inexorable historical laws but by the strategies adopted by actors in interdependent contexts. Furthermore, Schelling’s work (1960) applied this logic to the study of international conflicts and political negotiations, paving the way for a conception in which agency and expectations become decisive.

Finally, the studies of Axelrod (1984, 1997) and Ostrom (1990) demonstrated that even in contexts of conflicting interests, cooperation can emerge as a stable strategy—particularly in repeated games or when governance institutions reduce uncertainty. These contributions have reinforced the critique of the Marxist paradigm: far from being inevitably conflictual and zero-sum, many social interactions follow non-zero-sum logics, in which cooperation and coordination can expand collective welfare. From a contemporary perspective, this line of research has been enriched by evolutionary and complex dynamics models (Nowak 2006), which consolidate the idea that cooperation is not only possible but also adaptive and sustainable.

I. Marxism: Historical Fatalism, Economic Determinism, and Zero-Sum Logic

I.1. Historical Fatalism

One of Marxism’s most distinctive assumptions is its teleological view of history. Inspired by Hegelian dialectics, Marx held that modes of production follow one another necessarily: from feudalism to capitalism, and from there to socialism and communism. In this narrative, history has a “telos”: the overcoming of class antagonism and the beginning of true human history. Marx’s famous line about humanity leaving its “prehistory” reflects this fatalistic sense: the process may accelerate or slow down, but it cannot be stopped or reversed.

I.2. Economic Determinism

The second distinctive feature is the economic determinism of historical materialism. According to Marx, productive forces and relations of production form the base that ultimately determines the legal, political, and ideological superstructure. Cultural and political phenomena are thus interpreted as derivative expressions of the economic structure. In practice, this vision led to highly mechanistic models of historical interpretation: each social formation was destined to perish when its relations of production entered into contradiction with the development of the productive forces.

I.3. Zero-Sum Logic

The third component is the conception of capitalist exploitation. In the labor theory of value, the capitalist extracts surplus value by appropriating the unpaid labor of the worker. Value distribution thus appears as a zero-sum game: what the capitalist gains corresponds exactly to what the worker loses. This scheme underscores the irreconcilable nature of class conflict, since there would be no scenario in which both actors could improve their situation simultaneously.

Taken together, these three elements—fatalism, determinism, and zero-sum logic—structure a worldview that, while powerful in its explanatory capacity, tends to close off the possibility of alternative historical trajectories, the significance of strategic agency, and the existence of cooperative outcomes.

II. Nash and Game Theory: Alternatives to the Marxist Paradigm

Game theory, developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1940s and expanded by John Nash in the 1950s, constitutes an analytical framework that breaks with Marxism’s central premises. Its logic is neither historical nor teleological but strategic: it studies how individuals, firms, governments, or social classes interact through interdependent decision-making. The outcomes of these interactions do not depend on a predetermined historical necessity but on the incentives, strategies, and expectations of the actors involved.

II.1. Multiple Equilibria: Overcoming Fatalism

Nash’s central concept—the non-cooperative equilibrium—shows that there is no single inevitable outcome. The same set of actors can reach different results depending on their chosen strategies and how they anticipate others’ actions. This breaks with Marxist fatalism: history is not written in advance but is contingent, shaped by strategic and contextual choices. Historical trajectories are neither linear nor necessary but open and multiple.

II.2. Strategic Agency vs. Structural Determinism

Game theory revalues the role of agency. While actors face institutional and economic constraints, individual and collective decisions decisively shape outcomes. This contrasts with Marxist economic determinism, in which productive structures ultimately define the superstructure. Within a game-theoretic framework, structures matter, but actors have room to coordinate, negotiate, cooperate, or compete, generating non-predetermined scenarios.

II.3. Non-Zero-Sum Games and the Critique of Irreducible Conflict

Marxism reduces the capital–labor relationship to a zero-sum scheme: one’s gain is the other’s loss. Game theory, however, shows that non-zero-sum games exist, where cooperation can generate joint gains. The repeated prisoner’s dilemma, coordination games, or public goods problems illustrate that social interaction need not be irresolvable antagonism: actors can find cooperative equilibria that expand collective welfare.

Historically, this can be observed in the evolution of advanced capitalism, where collective bargaining, social security systems, and international cooperation have enabled simultaneous increases in the well-being of both workers and capitalists. While distributive tensions persist, the dynamics do not follow a strictly zero-sum pattern.

II.4. Cooperative Competition: A Conceptual Proposal

Building on concepts developed in game theory—particularly the notion of non-zero-sum games and the possibility of stable cooperative equilibria—we introduce the concept of cooperative competition. Cooperative competition refers to the capacity of actors to establish a common framework of rules and understandings that enables mutual cooperation without relinquishing the pursuit of individual goals through competition.

This form of cooperation is sustained by fundamental institutions such as private property, free competition, open markets, and the division of labor, and refers specifically to open, decentralized social cooperation emerging from respect for liberty and property.

Cooperative competition describes the logic of strategic interactions in free societies: actors need not surrender their individual objectives or coordinate hierarchically to achieve mutual gains. Rather, it is the existence of a shared institutional framework—based on general rules rather than central mandates—that allows competition to generate spontaneous cooperation.

This concept differs clearly from collusive arrangements, cartels, or monopolistic structures, which restrict competition and replace open cooperation with exclusionary agreements. Unlike the Marxist view, which interprets social relations as inherently conflictual and zero-sum, cooperative competition conceives of free markets as decentralized systems of social cooperation, where competitive interaction produces shared benefits.

III. Practical Cases: Contrasting Marx and Nash

The contrast between the Marxist paradigm and game theory becomes clearer when examining concrete cases in which social conflict can adopt dynamics different from zero-sum logic. Three areas are analyzed below: labor relations, international trade, and fiscal policy. In all of them, game theory—especially Robert Axelrod’s contributions to the study of cooperation—makes it possible to visualize alternative trajectories that Marxism tends to overlook.

III.1. Labor Relations: Conflict or Repeated Cooperation

From a Marxist perspective, the capital–labor relationship is necessarily conflictual: the capitalist extracts surplus value, and the worker is exploited. The game seems zero-sum. However, the historical experience of collective bargaining shows that it is possible to reach stable agreements that benefit both parties.

The repeated prisoner’s dilemma model, studied by Axelrod (1984), illustrates how cooperation can emerge even in contexts of distrust. In his simulations, simple strategies like tit-for-tat (“cooperate first, then mirror the other’s move”) proved highly stable. Applied to labor relations, this implies that capitalists and workers, by interacting repeatedly, can recognize that cooperation (e.g., higher wages in exchange for greater productivity) generates joint benefits, breaking the strict logic of irreducible antagonism.

III.2. International Trade: Unequal Exchange or Strategic Coordination

Marx characterized international trade as an extension of capitalist exploitation, in which peripheral countries are permanently subordinated to the center. This diagnosis fits a zero-sum view of the global arena.

Game theory, however, allows this to be nuanced. Multilateral agreements can be modeled as coordination games, where stability depends on each actor’s confidence that others will fulfill their commitments. The World Trade Organization and regional integration treaties are examples of cooperative equilibria that generate joint gains, even when distributive tensions persist. Axelrod’s paradigm of sustained cooperation in repeated contexts is crucial for understanding why, despite incentives for opportunism, countries tend to maintain shared rules.

III.3. Fiscal Policy and Redistribution: Class Antagonism or Institutional Equilibria

From a Marxist viewpoint, fiscal policy is interpreted as a class instrument, controlled by elites to preserve their interests. In practice, however, fiscal redistribution can be modeled as a game between taxpayers and beneficiaries, where stability depends on achieving a mutually acceptable equilibrium.

Here again, Axelrod’s logic proves illuminating: willingness to contribute (pay taxes) depends on expectations of reciprocity and repeated interaction over time. If taxpayers trust that resources will be used fairly, and if beneficiaries acknowledge that the system requires sustainability, a cooperative equilibrium can be maintained. Otherwise, dynamics may devolve into noncompliance, evasion, and fiscal crisis.

Summary

In all three cases, the application of game theory—and particularly Axelrod’s models of repeated cooperation—shows that actors are not condemned to fatalistic antagonism or zero-sum schemes. Strategic interaction opens space for cooperative outcomes and alternative historical trajectories, challenging the foundations of the Marxist paradigm.

IV. Discussion and Implications

The contrast between Marxism and game theory reveals two radically different ways of conceiving history and social interactions. On one hand, Marxism rests on a teleological and structural logic, in which the development of productive forces determines an inescapable historical destiny and class conflict is conceived as irreconcilable. On the other hand, game theory introduces a strategic perspective, where outcomes depend on actors’ choices, incentives, and expectations formed through repeated interactions.

This contrast does not imply dismissing Marxism’s explanatory power in certain contexts, especially regarding the identification of structural inequalities and distributive tensions. However, game theory broadens the interpretative framework by showing that conflicts do not always lead to zero-sum outcomes and that cooperation can be a stable and rational result.

Robert Axelrod’s contributions are particularly relevant in this discussion. His experiments on cooperation in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas show that initial distrust can be overcome through simple rules of reciprocity. This insight dismantles the Marxist assumption of irreducible antagonism: in contexts where actors interact repeatedly and past actions are remembered, cooperation can emerge as the dominant strategy.

Thus, game theory does not deny the existence of conflict—it explicitly incorporates it into its models—but rejects the idea that history is predetermined by universal laws. Instead, it opens the possibility of multiple historical trajectories, some conflictual and others cooperative, depending on strategic choices.

V. Conclusion

Classical Marxism rests on three conceptual pillars: a historical fatalism that views history as an inevitable march toward communism, an economic determinism that subordinates politics and culture to the productive structure, and a zero-sum logic that reduces social relations to irreconcilable distributive antagonism. These assumptions have shaped political practices and historiographical interpretations but have also limited Marxism’s explanatory capacity in the face of cooperation and nonlinear institutional change.

Game theory—particularly the concept of Nash equilibrium and Axelrod’s experiments on repeated cooperation—offers an alternative framework that overcomes these limitations. History and politics cease to be conceived as inescapable destinies and are instead understood as strategic processes in which multiple equilibria are possible and cooperation can generate joint gains.

Far from being a mere replacement, game theory can be seen as a complementary tool that revalues human agency, opens space for historical contingency, and shows that the future is not written in advance. In an interdependent world marked by collective dilemmas—from labor negotiations to global governance—this perspective proves more fruitful than the rigid frameworks inherited from classical Marxism.

References

• Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

• Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Engels, Friedrich. 1880. Del socialismo utópico al socialismo científico.

• Hegel, G.W.F. 1837. Lecciones sobre la Filosofía de la Historia Universal.

• Marx, Karl. 1859. Prólogo a la Contribución a la Crítica de la Economía Política.

• Marx, Karl, y Friedrich Engels. 1848. Manifiesto Comunista.

• Nash, John. 1950. “Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36 (1): 48–49.

• Nowak, Martin A. 2006. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

• Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

• Von Neumann, John, y Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.